# The extension update server Chrome has no update channel for an unpacked extension: it reads the folder off disk once and never looks again. This is the supported alternative — the extension is signed into a CRX, an update manifest is published next to it, and Chrome installs and updates it from there like any other extension. ``` droplet 159.223.129.19 Windows box key.pem ──signs──> autofirmer.crx ──HTTPS──> Chrome (policy install) updates.xml <──polls─── ``` Nothing here serves the dashboard. That still runs on the trading machine, next to the clicker, exactly as before. ## The pieces | | | |---|---| | `/opt/autofirmer-updates/key.pem` | The signing key. **The extension's identity.** | | `/opt/autofirmer-updates/public/` | `autofirmer.crx` and `updates.xml`, served as-is | | `deploy/pack-extension.sh` | Signs `extension/` and writes both files | | `deploy/docker-compose.yml` | An `nginx:alpine` that serves that folder and nothing else | | `deploy/nginx/ext.conf.template` | Rendered into the autotrader stack's `conf.d` | | `scripts/install-extension-policy.ps1` | The Windows side: one registry entry | Extension id: `lkjbblagjjbldlkeaaffhiopdlhniaan`, derived from the public half of the signing key and repeated in three places that must agree — `key` in `extension/manifest.json`, `appid` in `updates.xml`, and the forcelist entry in the policy script. `pack-extension.sh` refuses to publish when the first two have drifted apart, because the failure otherwise is silent: Chrome simply never sees an update that applies to it. **Losing `key.pem` means losing the extension.** A new key is a new id, which means a new policy entry on every machine and a fresh install rather than an update. It exists in one place, deliberately — it is not in the repo, and a compromised copy would let someone else publish an extension your browsers would trust and install. ## Ingress This stack owns no ingress. The droplet already runs one nginx on 80/443 for `master.juicerroom.com` and `git.juicerroom.com`, from `/opt/autotrader/deploy`; this joins that network, and `deploy.sh` renders a server block into that stack's `nginx/conf.d`. Two consequences: - The rendered `ext.conf` is untracked in the autotrader repo. It survives that stack's pulls and deploys, but not its `bootstrap-tls.sh`, which clears `conf.d` — re-run `./deploy.sh` here if that ever happens. - `deploy.sh` reloads the shared nginx, so a mistake in the template would be a mistake in front of the autotrader dashboard too. It runs `nginx -t` first and refuses to reload on a bad config, and will not install the TLS server block until the certificate actually exists. ## First run ```bash cp .env.example .env # set EXT_HOST ./bootstrap-tls.sh # DNS check, certificate, then deploy.sh ``` `bootstrap-tls.sh` borrows the autotrader stack's certbot container and Let's Encrypt account, reading `ACME_EMAIL` from its `.env` rather than keeping a second copy. The A record has to point at the droplet first. ## Publishing a release ```bash git pull && ./deploy/deploy.sh ``` `deploy.sh` packs whatever is in `extension/` at the version its `manifest.json` declares, so **bump that version or nothing updates** — Chrome compares versions and ignores a CRX that is not newer than what it has. The browsers pick it up on Chrome's own schedule, roughly every five hours. They also pick it up within seconds if the dashboard is running, because the extension asks Chrome for a check as soon as the dashboard reports a newer version than the one it is running. ## Installing it on a machine `setup-windows.bat` and `setup-linux.sh` both offer this as their last step, so a fresh instance needs nothing extra. To do it by hand, or on a machine that was set up before this existed: ```powershell powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts\install-extension-policy.ps1 ``` ```bash sudo scripts/install-extension-policy.sh ``` Both configure every Chromium-family browser they find, and narrowing that to one is `-Browser Chrome`. **Edge is the exception, and it is not one we can fix.** Unmanaged Edge installs extensions from the Microsoft Store and nowhere else. It reads the policy and then blanks it — `edge://policy` shows `[BLOCKED];` with "This device isn't managed by your organization" — so a self-hosted CRX cannot be installed there at all unless the machine is domain-joined, Intune-enrolled or Entra-joined. Chrome and Brave have no equivalent restriction. The script detects this and skips Edge rather than leaving a permanent policy error and a "Managed by your organization" badge behind; `-Force` overrides it. On a machine that has to be Edge, load `extension/` unpacked there instead. It still picks up releases: an unpacked copy reloads itself from disk when the dashboard reports a newer version, which is what the updater has already pulled. The Windows script writes to the current user's policy hive and needs no elevation; `-Scope Machine` covers every account on the box and does need an elevated shell. Linux has no per-user equivalent — Chrome only reads managed policy from `/etc` — so that one is root-only and machine-wide. Both take `-Remove` / `--remove`. Afterwards, remove the unpacked copy from `chrome://extensions` — it now has the same id, and Chrome will not load both — and restart the browser. Development still works the old way: load `extension/` unpacked on a machine with no policy entry. It keeps the same id (that is what `key` in the manifest is for), and there it reloads itself from disk rather than asking Chrome for an update.