autofirmer-expanded/lib/vest-session.ts

/**
 * Vest sessions relayed by the extension.
 *
 * Vest logs a person in through Google/Privy in the browser, and refreshes
 * the session with a device key the browser will not export, so this
 * machine cannot log in by itself. Instead the AutoFirmer extension watches
 * the signed-in Vest tab: whenever the Vest app renews its own ~15-minute
 * access token, the extension posts it here (POST /api/vest/session). The
 * Vest client (lib/vest-class.ts) trades with the latest one for its wallet
 * and mints per-account tokens from it.
 *
 * Kept in memory only — never in the DB, the logs, a report or a backup. A
 * restart forgets them; the Vest tab's next renewal (or the extension's
 * next tick) relays a fresh one within minutes.
 */

export interface VestSession {
    accessToken: string;
    /** Epoch ms the access token stops working. */
    expiresAt: number;
    /** The wallet the Vest login belongs to, lower-case. */
    primaryAddr: string;
    userId: string;
    receivedAt: number;
}

/** What the dashboard and the extension may see of a session: never the token. */
export interface VestSessionInfo {
    primaryAddr: string;
    userId: string;
    expiresAt: number;
    receivedAt: number;
}

const g = globalThis as typeof globalThis & {
    __vestSessions?: Map<string, VestSession>;
    __vestPrevious?: Map<string, VestSession>;
    __vestRefused?: Map<string, number>;
};

function store(): Map<string, VestSession> {
    return (g.__vestSessions ??= new Map());
}

/** The session each wallet's current one replaced — what a refused token
 *  falls back to. */
function previous(): Map<string, VestSession> {
    return (g.__vestPrevious ??= new Map());
}

/** Tokens the client found to be one account's, not the login's (by their
 *  tail — enough to tell them apart, never the whole token), with when. */
function refused(): Map<string, number> {
    return (g.__vestRefused ??= new Map());
}

const REFUSED_KEEP = 50;

/** Shortest life a relayed token must have left to be taken. */
const MIN_REMAINING_MS = 30_000;
/** Longest a relayed token may claim to live — a Vest access token is
 *  ~15 minutes; anything far beyond that is not one. */
const MAX_REMAINING_MS = 6 * 60 * 60_000;

/** Take a relayed session. Returns why it was refused, or null. A token for
 *  a wallet only ever replaces one that expires sooner. */
export function putVestSession(input: { accessToken: unknown; expiresAt: unknown; primaryAddr: unknown; userId: unknown }, now = Date.now()): string | null {
    const token = typeof input.accessToken === 'string' ? input.accessToken.trim() : '';
    const expiresAt = Number(input.expiresAt);
    const addr = typeof input.primaryAddr === 'string' ? input.primaryAddr.trim().toLowerCase() : '';
    if (!/^[\w-]+\.[\w-]+\.[\w-]+$/.test(token) || token.length > 8192) return 'accessToken is not a JWT';
    if (!/^0x[0-9a-f]{40}$/.test(addr)) return 'primaryAddr is not a wallet address';
    if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || expiresAt - now < MIN_REMAINING_MS) return 'token already expired';
    if (expiresAt - now > MAX_REMAINING_MS) return 'expiresAt is implausibly far away';
    if (refused().has(token.slice(-32))) return "that is one Vest account's token, not the login's — reload the Vest tab, or update the extension";
    const prev = store().get(addr);
    if (prev && prev.expiresAt > expiresAt && prev.accessToken !== token) return null; // keep the fresher one
    if (prev && prev.accessToken !== token) previous().set(addr, prev);
    store().set(addr, {
        accessToken: token,
        expiresAt,
        primaryAddr: addr,
        userId: typeof input.userId === 'string' ? input.userId : '',
        receivedAt: now,
    });
    return null;
}

/** The live session for a wallet, or null when none has been relayed or it
 *  is about to expire. */
export function vestSessionFor(primaryAddr: string, now = Date.now(), minRemainingMs = MIN_REMAINING_MS): VestSession | null {
    const s = store().get(primaryAddr.trim().toLowerCase());
    return s && s.expiresAt - now >= minRemainingMs ? s : null;
}

/** The client found the wallet's token to be one account's own (see
 *  accountScopedToken): drop it, and take it no more if it's relayed again —
 *  the login's own token, when the Vest app next renews it, takes its place. */
export function refuseVestSession(primaryAddr: string, token: string, now = Date.now()): void {
    const key = primaryAddr.trim().toLowerCase();
    refused().set(token.slice(-32), now);
    while (refused().size > REFUSED_KEEP) refused().delete(refused().keys().next().value as string);
    if (store().get(key)?.accessToken !== token) return;
    store().delete(key);
    // Back to the token it replaced, if that one is still good.
    const before = previous().get(key);
    previous().delete(key);
    if (before && !refused().has(before.accessToken.slice(-32)) && before.expiresAt - now >= MIN_REMAINING_MS) store().set(key, before);
}

/** Drop a wallet's session — the gateway refused it. */
export function dropVestSession(primaryAddr: string, token: string): void {
    const key = primaryAddr.trim().toLowerCase();
    if (store().get(key)?.accessToken === token) store().delete(key);
}

/** Every relayed session, newest first, without tokens. */
export function listVestSessions(): VestSessionInfo[] {
    return [...store().values()]
        .sort((a, b) => b.receivedAt - a.receivedAt)
        .map(({ primaryAddr, userId, expiresAt, receivedAt }) => ({ primaryAddr, userId, expiresAt, receivedAt }));
}