Brandon LiandClaude Opus 5
035f93d220
The dashboard-hosting stack from the previous commit is gone; it was answering a question nobody asked. What was actually needed is Chrome's real update channel, which an unpacked extension does not have and cannot be given. So the extension is now signed into a CRX with an update manifest beside it, served from the droplet, and installed on the trading machines by policy (ExtensionInstallForcelist). From there Chrome installs it, updates it on its own schedule, and puts it back if it goes missing. The manifest gained the `key` that fixes the extension id, so an unpacked development load keeps the same identity as the published build. The self-update check now branches on how it was installed: policy installs ask Chrome to check the update server now rather than waiting out its five-hour cycle, and unpacked loads keep the reload-from-disk path. chrome.management .getSelf() tells the two apart and needs no permission to do it. The signing key lives at /opt/autofirmer-updates/key.pem on the droplet and nowhere else. It is the extension's identity: a different key is a different extension, and no browser would take it as an update. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
98 lines
4.2 KiB
Markdown
98 lines
4.2 KiB
Markdown
# The extension update server
|
|
|
|
Chrome has no update channel for an unpacked extension: it reads the folder off
|
|
disk once and never looks again. This is the supported alternative — the
|
|
extension is signed into a CRX, an update manifest is published next to it, and
|
|
Chrome installs and updates it from there like any other extension.
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
droplet 159.223.129.19 Windows box
|
|
key.pem ──signs──> autofirmer.crx ──HTTPS──> Chrome (policy install)
|
|
updates.xml <──polls───
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Nothing here serves the dashboard. That still runs on the trading machine, next
|
|
to the clicker, exactly as before.
|
|
|
|
## The pieces
|
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|---|---|
|
|
| `/opt/autofirmer-updates/key.pem` | The signing key. **The extension's identity.** |
|
|
| `/opt/autofirmer-updates/public/` | `autofirmer.crx` and `updates.xml`, served as-is |
|
|
| `deploy/pack-extension.sh` | Signs `extension/` and writes both files |
|
|
| `deploy/docker-compose.yml` | An `nginx:alpine` that serves that folder and nothing else |
|
|
| `deploy/nginx/ext.conf.template` | Rendered into the autotrader stack's `conf.d` |
|
|
| `scripts/install-extension-policy.ps1` | The Windows side: one registry entry |
|
|
|
|
Extension id: `lkjbblagjjbldlkeaaffhiopdlhniaan`, derived from the public half of
|
|
the signing key and repeated in three places that must agree — `key` in
|
|
`extension/manifest.json`, `appid` in `updates.xml`, and the forcelist entry in
|
|
the policy script. `pack-extension.sh` refuses to publish when the first two
|
|
have drifted apart, because the failure otherwise is silent: Chrome simply never
|
|
sees an update that applies to it.
|
|
|
|
**Losing `key.pem` means losing the extension.** A new key is a new id, which
|
|
means a new policy entry on every machine and a fresh install rather than an
|
|
update. It exists in one place, deliberately — it is not in the repo, and a
|
|
compromised copy would let someone else publish an extension your browsers
|
|
would trust and install.
|
|
|
|
## Ingress
|
|
|
|
This stack owns no ingress. The droplet already runs one nginx on 80/443 for
|
|
`master.juicerroom.com` and `git.juicerroom.com`, from `/opt/autotrader/deploy`;
|
|
this joins that network, and `deploy.sh` renders a server block into that
|
|
stack's `nginx/conf.d`. Two consequences:
|
|
|
|
- The rendered `ext.conf` is untracked in the autotrader repo. It survives that
|
|
stack's pulls and deploys, but not its `bootstrap-tls.sh`, which clears
|
|
`conf.d` — re-run `./deploy.sh` here if that ever happens.
|
|
- `deploy.sh` reloads the shared nginx, so a mistake in the template would be a
|
|
mistake in front of the autotrader dashboard too. It runs `nginx -t` first and
|
|
refuses to reload on a bad config, and will not install the TLS server block
|
|
until the certificate actually exists.
|
|
|
|
## First run
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
cp .env.example .env # set EXT_HOST
|
|
./bootstrap-tls.sh # DNS check, certificate, then deploy.sh
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
`bootstrap-tls.sh` borrows the autotrader stack's certbot container and Let's
|
|
Encrypt account, reading `ACME_EMAIL` from its `.env` rather than keeping a
|
|
second copy. The A record has to point at the droplet first.
|
|
|
|
## Publishing a release
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
git pull && ./deploy/deploy.sh
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
`deploy.sh` packs whatever is in `extension/` at the version its `manifest.json`
|
|
declares, so **bump that version or nothing updates** — Chrome compares versions
|
|
and ignores a CRX that is not newer than what it has.
|
|
|
|
The browsers pick it up on Chrome's own schedule, roughly every five hours. They
|
|
also pick it up within seconds if the dashboard is running, because the
|
|
extension asks Chrome for a check as soon as the dashboard reports a newer
|
|
version than the one it is running.
|
|
|
|
## Installing it on a machine
|
|
|
|
From an elevated PowerShell on the Windows box:
|
|
|
|
```powershell
|
|
powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts\install-extension-policy.ps1
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Then remove the unpacked copy from `chrome://extensions` — it now has the same
|
|
id, and Chrome will not load both — and restart Chrome. `-Remove` undoes it;
|
|
`-Browser Edge` or `-Browser Brave` writes the same entry for those instead.
|
|
|
|
Development still works the old way: load `extension/` unpacked on a machine
|
|
with no policy entry. It keeps the same id (that is what `key` in the manifest
|
|
is for), and there it reloads itself from disk rather than asking Chrome for an
|
|
update.
|